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Executive Summary
EPA will soon propose performance standards under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act for greenhouse gas pollution from the two largest emitting sectors-fossil-fueled power plants and petroleum refineries. The form these standards will take remains unclear. Many from industry, environmental groups, and academia argue that to be effective and efficient, the standards should incorporate compliance flexibility. This broad term encompasses a range of design choices that provide spatial or temporal flexibility in achieving aggregate emissions outcomes.
There is widespread agreement in the academic community that § 111 authorizes the use of many types of flexible approaches. Given agency discretion to define uncertain statutory terms like "best system of emission reduction," and given the potential of compliance flexibility mechanisms to reduce costs while preserving total emissions reduction goals, EPA and the states should be able to fit a variety of flexible approaches into the statutory criteria for performance standards.
EPA and states can likely grant compliance flexibility to existing sources. EPA can outline specific flexible structures in its guidance to states, though it likely cannot reject state implementation plans solely for failure to adopt a flexible approach.
Compliance flexibility may be possible for new sources, albeit limited in practice. The plain statutory text supports flexibility for new sources, though a lack of precedent and possible interactions with New Source Review could complicate application.
Inter-sector trading is probably permissible. EPA has broad statutory authority to define the scope of categories of regulated polluters. EPA can likely define a category encompassing multiple types of major greenhouse gas emitters, and thereby allow trading between sources currently in different categories. Alternatively, even without newly defined or larger categories, there is no express statutory preclusion to trading across existing categories.
No consensus exists on whether offsets are permissible. But 
Overview of Statutory Structure
Section 111 of the CAA governs EPA's powers to set performance standards for "source categories" (sectors) defined by the agency. First, the agency must list categories of stationary sources that contribute significantly to air pollution that endangers public health or welfare. 2 Once a category has been defined, EPA must propose a federal standard of performance to regulate all new sources within that category. 3 These standards must reflect emissions cuts achievable under "the best system of emission reduction which . . . the administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated," taking into account costs and other factors. 4 For pollution regulated elsewhere under the CAA, the § 111 process ends here. But if emissions from existing sources are not controlled via other CAA regulation (and so far for GHG emissions, they are not), § 111(d) of the CAA authorizes EPA to regulate them with performance standards. 5 EPA sets guidelines for these standards, but the states implement them. This process is explicitly similar to that found in § 110 of the CAA 6 and requires states to submit a plan establishing a "standard of performance for any existing source for any air pollutant." 7 States have broad flexibility to implement § 111(d) standards, 8 though EPA retains approval power and the ability to regulate if a state fails to do so. 9 The only explicit limitations on state authority are the requirement that they establish "performance standards" and the EPA regulations requiring that plans be at least as stringent as, and occur at least as quickly as, the federal guidelines, creating a federal emissions backstop. 10 This document addresses whether the CAA, and specifically § 111, allows EPA to use these tools. 
A. Fundamental Justifications for a Flexible System
Section 111 of the CAA allows for a high degree of flexibility in implementing standards of performance. As defined under § 111, a standard of performance is based on "the best system of emission reduction . . . taking into account the cost." This language almost certainly is broad enough to enable both EPA and states to incorporate compliance flexibility: using their statutory discretion, those authorities can define many flexible approaches as the most efficient (and therefore the "best") systems for reducing emissions at the sector level. 12 This discretion to define statutory criteria is central to EPA and states" ability to implement any flexibility mechanisms.
The minority opposing view holds that flexible mechanisms cannot be justified, based on an assumed negative inference from statutory silence on specific flexibility mechanisms. A further objection claims that § 111 requires regulation of individual sources, implying no single source can be allowed to emit more and then pay for it. 13 However, particularly given the deference owed to agencies under Chevron v. NRDC, 14 such a negative inference is unwarranted.
Courts do not typically act on negative inferences without clear congressional intent. 15 Furthermore, to the extent that Congress has spoken on the issue, it has removed, rather than added, barriers to flexible mechanisms in EPA regulations. In 1990, Congress amended § 111 to remove the word "technology" from its definition of performance standards, indicating that standards need not be technology-based. 16 The legality of flexibility for existing sources under § 111 also has support from past 
B. EPA Guidance and Approval of SIP-like State Programs
EPA has the authority to outline flexible structures in its guidance to states on existing source regulation, either in the form of a specific preferred option or by listing several alternative options. 21 EPA almost certainly also has the authority to implement flexible systems in any Federal Implementation Plan equivalent (FIPe), because the CAA gives EPA the identical authority as states in the design of a federal "backstop" program for existing sources. 22 In fact, if EPA includes some of these flexible mechanisms in its proposed FIPe, it may reduce some of the uncertainty around the question of state equivalency (which is measured against a federal backstop that the FIPe helps to set).
There has been little scholarship on whether states will be able to submit a joint or coordinated SIPe, which would allow trading between states and might be useful in meshing CAA standards with existing regional trading programs (like RGGI 
C. Potential Conflict with NAAQS
There is no legal certainty on whether EPA can be forced to adopt National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for greenhouse gases. This is a complex question outside the scope of this document. 27 However, if EPA were forced to adopt a GHG NAAQS (or chose to do so), regulation of existing sources under § 111(d) would be prohibited. 28 It is worth noting that the legal path to forcing EPA to issue NAAQS would be a very long one: even if this potential conflict does eventually become a problem, a §111-based program could operate successfully for many years. Nevertheless, the application of flexible approaches to new sources is legally and practically more uncertain than for existing sources. The negative inference argument is plausibly stronger for new sources, given legislative history that continued to link new source standards to technology-specific controls even after the 1990 Amendments. 31 The regulatory precedent is also weaker: though EPA did include new sources in the market created by CAMR, that rule also simultaneously bound new sources to baseline performance standards. 32 NRDC invalidated ASARCO. We further note that the statute has been amended since both those cases and the original decision concerned the definition of "source" rather than "performance standard" 33 -ASARCO"s holding apparently would not apply to an EPA definition of compliance flexibility as "the best system of emission reduction."
Ultimately, courts typically only accept negative inferences if they are confident that Congress intended to preclude the unmentioned policy option. 34 Additionally, agencies are generally granted deference in their evolving interpretation of statutes, 35 and EPA will be afforded some discretion to interpret the statutory criteria for "performance standards" under § 111(b). 36 Thus, flexible mechanisms are likely available for new sources, 37 though they remain a risky option because they are untested. 38 A safer option might be for EPA to issue baseline performance standards for new sources (as it did in CAMR) and, in a separate and severable rulemaking, incorporate new sources under a single flexible regime with existing sources.
Note that any limitations on EPA"s authority to regulate new sources under § 111(b)-either due to negative inferences or legal precedents-will not affect its more expansive authority to regulate existing sources with a § 111(d) FIPe in lieu of adequate state action.
B. Potential Interactions with New Source Review
New sources are also subject to permit requirements under a different CAA program:
new source review (NSR). Traditionally, performance standards are less stringent than NSR"s "best available control technology" (BACT) requirements. 39 As the flexibility created under § 111 incentivizes new sources to adopt tighter emissions controls, emerging technologies may become "available" for purposes of BACT determinations and ratchet up NSR requirements even further. EPA will likely need to provide guidance on the interaction between §111 performance standards and NSR, particularly if flexibility for new sources is explored.
FINDING 3:
Inter-sector trading is probably permissible.
EPA has broad statutory authority to define the scope of categories of regulated polluters.
EPA can likely define a category encompassing multiple types of major greenhouse gas emitters, and thereby allow trading between sources currently in different categories. Alternatively, even without newly defined or larger categories, there is no express statutory preclusion to trading across existing categories.
A. Defining Source Categories
EPA has broad authority to "distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories of new sources." 40 Courts have found EPA has "considerable discretion under section 111" and have upheld EPA"s decision to issue a single, uniform standard for sources that were previously treated as separate subcategories. 41 Thus, EPA can likely expand any existing category to include sources from any other existing category or newly regulated source types (though the latter would also require a new endangerment finding). EPA could even plausibly create a single category for all sources with GHG emissions above a certain threshold. While EPA should be able to exercise this authority to recategorize at any time, it could be more complicated legally or practically for EPA to adjust categories in the future after performance standards already exist.
Though EPA is only contemplating GHG performance standards for one or two categories initially, if the agency wants to pursue this option of combining multiple categories in the future, it may want to start soliciting comments now.
B. Trading Between Source Categories
There is no express statutory preclusion to trading across existing categories. In fact, a flexible mechanism that allows trading across categories could arguably fit the definition of "the best system of emission reduction." 42 Nevertheless, several academics worry that the lack of clear statutory authority or precedent creates some doubt, particularly on the question of whether state equivalency must be demonstrated independently in every regulated category. 43 The existence of such doubts may suggest that the recategorization method discussed above is the least risky path to inter-sector trading. In any case, states with emissions limits more stringent than EPA"s could allow inter-category trading to meet emissions goals beyond EPA"s. EPA will likely need to provide guidance on how states will establish equivalency.
C. Other Coverage Issues
A few other legal issues relating to flexibility and scope of coverage are worth mentioning. As with EPA"s § 202 endangerment finding, the agency should be able to define the targeted pollutant under § 111 as the mix of all GHGs; 44 
A. Offsets under § 111(d)
As noted above, the prevailing view among legal scholars is that EPA, states operating under § 111(d) regulations, and states operating independently can permit trading among sources covered by regulation. This general agreement breaks down somewhat when considering whether emissions reduction measures taken outside the regulated sphere can be included within trading programs. The most prominent such measures are offsets.
Analysts taking the position that offsets are permissible point to elements of legislative history, like the statute"s move away from requirements for on-site, technology-based compliance and congressional references to allowable reductions achieved by third parties; 47 to the lack of statutory preclusion; 48 and to the explicit availability of a limited class of offsets under NAAQS. 49 Other proponents argue that it is difficult to draw principled distinctions between inter-sector trading (see Finding #3 above) and offsets. 50 Those taking the opposite position argue that the availability of NAAQS offsets generates a negative inference, 51 or that offsets appear incompatible with the source category-driven design of § 111. 52 Section 111 performance standards, unlike NAAQS, explicitly target emissions reductions from regulated source categories, rather than concentrations of a regulated pollutant. 53 Offset critics argue that this may pose a modest problem for offsets created by reducing emissions at unregulated facilities, since they do not reduce emissions from any regulated source category. They further suggest that it poses more serious problems for offsets that have no effect on emissions, but putatively affect ambient greenhouse gas concentrations (such as forest offsets).
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B. Federal-State Interactions under § 111(d)
There appear to be few limits on states" ability to incorporate offsets into their independent state and regional-level programs, such as AB32 and RGGI. 55 If states are able to use offsets (or other alternative compliance mechanisms) in their independent programs, but not under § 111(d), the relationship between the CAA and state/regional programs becomes more complex. To the extent that emitters use offsets or other tools to comply with state program requirements, EPA and the states may be unable to count those reductions for purposes of compliance with § 111(d) regulations. This is not necessarily fatal to efforts to achieve compatibility: the CAA does not preempt state programs, which would presumably be more stringent. Offsets and related tools could still be used to meet this additional compliance burden.
It is not clear whether a state could implement more stringent regulation, perhaps including offsets, via its SIPe (relying on CAA authority) 56 or if separate supporting state legislation would be required. Constitutional limits on state power (for example, the requirement for congressional approval of inter-state compacts, 57 or the inability of states to engage in binding international agreements 58 ) may also limit certain types of offset arrangements. 
A. General Allocation Authority
States almost certainly have the authority to allocate permits however they choose, provided minimum federal emissions standards are still met. 59 For example, states could conduct a coordinated auction or distribute permits in a manner that promotes policy goals, such as protecting consumers by allocating based on output in order to lessen electricity price changes and preserve in-state generation, or rewarding individual facilities for repowering and/or biomass use. 60 EPA can also allocate permits in many different ways. There is no consensus on whether EPA can auction permits, 61 but if it can, any revenue would need to go directly to the treasury.
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B. Banking and Borrowing
Several existing market-based approaches to flexible compliance include banking and borrowing mechanisms, whereby excess reductions can be saved for future compliance periods or facilities with insufficient reductions can pay extra in future compliance periods. Unlimited banking would probably not compromise state equivalency requirements, because emissions reductions need only be realized at least as quickly as the federal standard. 63 Borrowing against future compliance periods is more legally ambiguous, since it could violate the requirement that a SIPe achieve reductions at least as quickly as the EPA backstop would. Some scholars have pointed to § 110(a)(2)(A), which allows SIPs to include schedules and timetables for compliance, as granting states some independence on the timeline for compliance from federal norms (recall that § 111(d) references the § 110 SIP-approval process). 64 Further, the ability of states to account for "other factors" under § 111(d) may imply that states can consider future compliance promises in allowing more immediate deviations from EPA baselines. However, there is no academic consensus on whether such language in fact justifies borrowing. The strongest language against borrowing comes in EPA"s own requirements that state plans achieve emission reductions "at least as quickly" as the federal baseline 65 -though this requirement is not explicitly mandated by the statutory text, and EPA could change this regulation in the context of GHGs in order to more clearly permit some borrowing mechanisms.
C. Cost-Containment Mechanisms
Another common feature of emissions markets is a floor and ceiling price beyond which no allowances can be sold. A floor price does not present any complications, because if it has any effect, it will be to reduce emissions. However, a ceiling price on allowances enforced with an unlimited ability to buy allowances at a given maximum price could (similar to offsets, above) cause a SIPe to fail the equivalency requirement. A ceiling price that works by borrowing future allowances might be permissible if borrowing itself is allowed.
The ability of states to consider cost and other factors in setting up their emissions reduction systems under § 111(d) may independently allow for controls on allowance prices.
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EPA may be able to reduce some of the uncertainty around the question of state equivalency and price ceilings if it uses its own statutory authority to apply reasonable cost constraints to its FIPe and emissions standards. 67 States could then likely set a price ceiling at or above EPA"s own determination of reasonable costs. States to make commitments in international negotiations.
Conclusion
There is agreement-broad among legal academics and universal among the authors here-that EPA has the tools under § 111 of the CAA to implement relatively flexible and efficient GHG regulation. The agency could use a range of compliance flexibility options itself, or facilitate state implementation plans that adopt such measures at the state or regional level.
EPA appears to have authority to include many specific flexible or market-design tools in § 111 regulation, including tradable performance standards operating across sectors, price floors, banking of credits or allowances, and, in principle, nationwide cap-and-trade. Regulations likely can also increase in breadth or stringency over time-EPA appears to have the authority (and the opportunity) to achieve ambitious environmental goals while providing regulatory predictability to industry. These tools can make CAA policy more effective and more efficient. More broadly,
EPA can-indeed must-consider both costs and other environmental impacts in setting GHG performance standards. The above uncertainty should not, however, distract from the larger conclusion that EPA has much of the authority it needs. To forgo compliance flexibility would be excessively cautious; arguably, carefully designed compliance flexibility is required for the agency to meet its statutory requirement to implement the best system of emissions reductions.
